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Abstract 
 
In the Interpretation of Dreams Freud asks how and if the dream, which is 
made of images, can express its connective structure, and in particular the 
negation. This can be made only by interpretation. This question represents 
the thread to examine the problem of the critical import of figurative arts, by 
comparing Adorno’s and Heidegger’s theories. According to Adorno, the 
artwork is mimesis: the capability to express negativity coincides with its 
autonegation, with its disappearing. For Heidegger, on the contrary, the 
artwork is first of all a work, and interpretation is the reconstruction of its 
genesis, or better, the understanding of it as temporal. In the last part of the 
text the problem of the relationship between negation and image is tackled 
discussing Magritte’s painting «Ceci n’est pas une pipe»: the structure of this 
painting (it is formed by images and words) makes it a rebus (like the dream, 
according to Freud), the deciphering of which carries a conceptual and 
interpretative work. Only this interpretation can account for the negation 
that it, as image, could otherwise not express. 
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1.  
In the Interpretation of Dreams Sigmund Freud poses a 
very interesting problem: in Chapter 6, after having stated that 
the dream is made of images, he nonetheless denies that it has 
to be understood as a pictorial composition. Like hieroglyphic 
writing, it is rather a kind of “puzzle (rebus)” (Freud 2005, 523), 
where pictures have to be taken in their symbolic function. 
That notwithstanding, a very radical question arises: after 
having compared the dream work to an “assemblage” of blocks 
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of ice,  Freud asks, how is it possible in the dream to represent 
linguistic elements for which there are no possible images?  
When the whole mass of these dream thoughts is subjected to the 
pressure of the dream activity, during which the parts are turned 
about, broken up, and pushed together, something like drifting ice, 
there arises the question, what becomes of the logical ties which until 
now had given form to the structure? What representation do “if,” 
“because,” “as though,” “although,” “either—or,” and all the other 
conjunctions (Präpositionen), without which we cannot understand a 
phrase or a sentence, receive in the dream? (Freud 2005, 569) 
This limitation regards all figurative arts, from pictures to 
sculpture, which, unlike poetry, are not able to express such 
relations. 
Here Freud implicitly poses the problem of the relation 
between representation and understanding, image and thought: 
the dream can represent only the oneiric content, its material, 
but not its relations, its conjunctions, what Freud in the 
original text generically calls “prepositions” (the most 
syntactical of the grammatical categories). The task of 
reconstructing these connections, which the dream-work has 
destroyed, is precisely what is demanded to interpretation. 
For a series of reasons, which here I cannot fully explain, 
but which concern linguistic and ontological questions of very 
great importance to me, I will in general call “pre-positive” 
(Chiurazzi 2009) this relational and connective structure, which 
the image cannot express, and which instead interpretation has 
to make understandable: these connections are in fact only the 
objects of understanding: they cannot be seen or perceived. The 
meaningfulness of the word “preposition” consists in that: it 
means something which “stands before” the position; by this I 
would suggest that the connective structure, as a pre-positive 
structure, is the condition of every positivity, or, in other words: 
the syntactic structure of a language precedes its lexical 
structure, the sense precedes the meaning. 
 The different relevance given to these elements 
distinguishes in my opinion phenomenology and hermeneutics. 
Phenomenology is founded on vision: its preferred gnoseological 
medium is then the image, which has its grammatical correlate 
in the noun, since this refers to the object in the world or to that 
Freud calls “oneiric material”; hermeneutics, on the contrary, is 
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founded on understanding: its gnoseological object is sense, 
which has its grammatical correlate in the “pre-positive” 
connections between nouns, to which no object corresponds in 
the world. This difference is particularly relevant in relation to 
the question posed at the beginning of this essay: how can 
image express the connective structure of the dream? 
 The most difficult connection to represent in the dream, 
Freud writes, is negation, that is, contrast or contradiction. 
“The attitude of the dream towards the category of antithesis 
and contradiction is most striking. This category is 
unceremoniously neglected; the word ‘No’ does not seem to exist 
for the dream.” (Freud 2005, 579) There is a limit, which is 
intrinsic to the imaginative representation: to be able only to 
affirm. The image, as with the nouns, is always positive, a 
difficulty that has troubled philosophy since Plato: how is it 
possible to say through images or words that something “is 
not”?  
 The image cannot express non-being. A painting of 
Magritte illustrates–I would say “represents”–this situation 
well. It represents a pipe under which we read the writing “ceci 
n’est pas une pipe,” “this is not a pipe.” The stratagem of this 
painting is similar to that which Freud says about some old 
paintings, in which “little tags were hung from the mouths of 
the persons represented giving the speech, the expression of 
which in the picture the artist despaired of” (Freud 2005, 570). 
The painting of Magritte cannot represent the fact of “not 
being” a pipe—it must say it. In order to deny being a thing, 
and thus to affirm being only an image, it must recur to 
writing, to a logos, so becoming, as the dream to Freud, a rebus. 
Negation has no figure. That the image cannot express 
negation means that it cannot express any distance from 
reality, since negation means exactly this: a distance, a 
fracture, a separation. Nonetheless, is it possible to confer to 
the image such a critical import? and if so, how? This question 
coincides with another one: in which sense is the figurative art 
critical? The avant-garde has no doubt represented and spread 
a critical force without precedent, well recognized by authors as 
Adorno, Derrida, or Vattimo. But there is a difference, in my 
opinion, in the way this critical capability can be understood. To 
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this purpose I will refer to two examples: Adorno and 
Heidegger. 
 
2.  
In Aesthetic Theory Adorno makes a striking re-
evaluation of the image: as Axel Honneth pointed out in a book 
published in 1986, The Critique of the Power. Reflective Stages 
in a Critical Social Theory, this re-evaluation of mimesis is the 
result of the radical critique of instrumental rationality Adorno 
put forward, along with Max Horkheimer, in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (Honneth 1993, 57-96). In fact, the mimetic 
relation is an approach to the world not based on domination: it 
is rather a way of relation which deliberately avoids the 
instrumental strategies of the cultural industry, and thus can 
present itself as a paradigm of liberation, for it leaves out the 
conceptual, objectifying knowledge of nature. However, in order 
to have a hold over the real, a minimal mimetic relation with 
reality is always needed: “The reason that represses mimesis is 
not merely its opposite. It is itself mimesis: of death. The 
subjective mind which disintegrates the spiritualization of 
nature masters spiritless nature only by imitating its rigidity, 
disintegrating itself as animistic.” (Horkheimer and Adorno 
2002, 44-45) Every image is an image of reality, and when 
thought severs this link with reality it withdraws into itself, it 
becomes tautological: “The idea, having no firm hold on reality, 
insists all the more and becomes the fixation.” (Horkheimer and 
Adorno 2002, 157) It becomes ideology. 
According to Adorno, art has the task to restore the 
correct mimetic relation to nature, that is, to restore the 
natural relation of thought to the real. It does nothing but to 
replicate, on the level of artificiality, this privileged relation. In 
aesthetic mimesis, unlike in conceptual mimesis, things are not 
the counterpart of manipulative processes, but of sensorial 
processes, which are not subject to any constriction but have 
the possibility of breaking off in a completely free way. The 
mimetic relation to nature is the profound essence of very art, 
which assures the convergence between artistic beauty and 
natural beauty, where nature is understood as pure 
manifestation, never as material of work or of life-reproduction, 
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less than ever as a substrate of science: “Just how bound up 
natural beauty is with art beauty is confirmed by the 
experience of the former. For it, nature is exclusively 
appearance, never the stuff of labor and the reproduction of life, 
let alone the substratum of science.” (Adorno 2002, 65) 
This phenomenological primacy explains at the same 
time the secondary and derivative role of the conceptual in 
Adorno, and his suspicion against technique and every 
pragmatic dimension. The very place of mimesis is neither the 
concept nor the technique, but the sensation, which follows 
“naturally” the movement of the object; the concept, instead, 
dominates the object, and bends it to external purposes: it 
manipulates the object. Art and technique, therefore, are 
different just like sensation and concept, renunciation and 
domination. 
Confined to its mimetic and not its technical moment, 
art is, according to Adorno, more art the less it is action. By re-
proposing the analogy between artistic experience and aesthetic 
experience of nature, Adorno says clearly: “Like the experience 
of art, the aesthetic experience of nature is that of images. 
Nature, as appearing beauty, is not perceived as an object of 
action” (ibid.). What confers to the mimesis, and then to the 
image, this special role of resistance to domination is thus its 
non-involvement in action, its being pure appearance: the 
radicalism of the critique to instrumental rationality also ends 
up striking down action as such (as it often seems to strike 
down rationality as such) and therefore to turn into a relation 
in which action is reduced to a minimum, as it is in the 
passivity of sensation. 
Aisthesis is, in fact, appearance. The artwork does 
nothing but to capture the evanescence of aisthesis by 
objectifying it: “In art something momentary transcends; 
objectivation makes the artwork into an instant” (Adorno 2002, 
84). The artworks are “the persistence of the transient” (ibid.). 
One understands this way why the critical function of the 
artwork as image, according to Adorno, cannot consist in 
nothing else than in its self-negation: “The phenomenon of 
fireworks is prototypical for artworks” (Adorno 2002, 81). In 
order to explicate their critical force against the existent, they 
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have to disappear, to explode: “The instant in which these 
forces become image, the instant in which what is interior 
becomes exterior, the outer husk is exploded; their apparition, 
which makes them an image, always at the same time destroys 
them as image” (Adorno 2002, 85). 
The artwork cannot deny the thing-like nature of the 
objects but by denying it in itself, i.e.: by denying itself. This 
dialectic thus remains completely closed inside the mimetic 
relation “thing-image,” in a way which I would define as 
“speculative,” and which places off limits every practical 
determination of the artwork as a product, namely, as a work. 
This way of thinking seems incomprehensible even for a 
Marxist and in my view shows clearly the Hegelian, namely, 
speculative character of Adorno’s philosophy. Artworks, in fact, 
tend more and more to be like what Hegel calls “concept”: 
something reflected in itself, self-movement. They are not made 
by humans, they are not the expression of a praxis, but have in 
themselves the principle of their doing: “Their immanent 
process is externalized as their own act, not as what humans 
have done to them and not merely for humans.” (Adorno 2002, 
80-81) 
The mimetic structure of the artwork risks expelling it 
completely from history, from the system of productive 
relations, which are always practical and energetic, namely: 
from the social relations. We thus understand why Axel 
Honneth has been able to speak, referring to Adorno’s critical 
theory, of a paradoxical “repression of the social” (Honneth 
1993, 72). We can then ask in which sense the artwork, which 
as mimesis opposes the world of the things, can also be really a 
critique of the social relations which structure that world of 
things. The image cannot express, as we saw, the pre-positional 
connections, that is, the relations linking words or things, and 
which in the real world are social relations, between humans 
and things, and between humans and humans.  In order to do 
this, the artwork should not be thought as mere image: it 
should carry a reference to these relations, presenting itself 
explicitly as a part of them. Not as image, then, but as a work. 
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3. 
The difference between conceiving the artwork as 
mimesis and conceiving it as work is evident in the way 
Heidegger, unlike Adorno, intends it. In The Origin of the Work 
of Art Heidegger starts from the banal consideration that the 
artwork is, precisely, a work, that is, the result of a doing: “The 
workly character of the work consists in its being created by the 
artist”, so that “it can obviously be grasped only in terms of the 
process of creation”, in its turn intended “as a bringing forth 
(Herstellung)” (Heidegger 2002, 34). In this way Heidegger 
refers the artwork primarily to the field of techne rather than to 
the field of mimesis: the artwork is not primarily a 
representation, not an image, but the result of an operation. As 
such, it is not simply an object: its object-being, however, does 
not constitute its work-being (Heidegger 2002, 20). 
In the field of technical doing, which is a doing based on 
a specific knowing, Aristotle distinguished two modalities: 
poiesis, the doing which has an external purpose, and praxis, 
the doing which has its purpose in itself. The Aristotelian 
distinction sets, on one side, the production of artificial objects, 
artifacts, objects of everyday utility, such as a table or a piece of 
furniture, but also works of art, such as a statue or a painting; 
on the other side, instead, there is moral doing, praxis, which 
has its purpose in itself, as its purpose is not an object but the 
good life. 
Heidegger, even though he never again takes up this 
distinction explicitly, uses it here in order to operate a 
conceptual shifting, which is extremely important. It literarily 
shifts the place of the art. In Aristotelian view, in fact, the 
production of objects consists in giving form to a matter in sight 
of their possible use. In this respect, the object of poiesis is 
always a tool or equipment: “The equipment’s readiness for use 
means that it is released beyond itself to disappear into 
usefulness.” (Heidegger 2002, 39) On the contrary, for 
Heidegger the process of creation in the artwork is not finalized 
to an external use, but to the fixation of truth in the figure 
(ibid.), which means: presentification of the event of Being. The 
artwork is the “setting truth into the work” (Heidegger 2002, 
36); it brings forth the event-like character of Being: in front of 
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an artwork we cannot but realize that it is made; what is 
important is not who made it, for instance a great artist, 
neither its utilitarian purpose, but the mere fact that it was 
made: 
The point is not that the created work be certified as a product of 
ability so as thereby to raise the public profile of the producer. What is 
announced is not “N.N. fecit.” Rather, “factum est” is what is to be held 
forth into the open by the work: in other words this, that an 
unconcealment of beings has happened here and, as this happening, 
happens here for the first time; or this, that this work is rather than is 
not (Heidegger 2002, 39). 
The artwork shows the mere “that” (daß) of the being, its “there 
is”: but as such, as what, which could not have been. 
We can then understand the difference between this 
conception of the artwork and Adorno’s. Heidegger definitively 
takes art away from the horizon of mimesis; art is poetry 
(Dichtung), because what is prevailing in it is not the figurative 
aspect as such, but its being a work, which makes it a trace of 
an event, of a history. The work has a diagrammatic nature, it 
is a symbol or a “fundamental design (Grundriss; Heidegger 
2002, 38)” of the event of Being. This shifting from the image to 
the symbol is the most notable consequence of the shifting from 
the phenomenological to the hermeneutical conception of the 
artwork: in it the point is not the mimetic, i.e. aesthetic, 
moment, but the symbolic, i.e. hermeneutical one. The artwork 
is thus no longer a “sensible object,” as Adorno claims, but an 
object of understanding. 
In fact, that the artwork has an origin can only be 
understood, because understanding can go beyond mere 
presence – that is, beyond sensation – in order to grasp what is 
not present, something else, something absent. This is a 
function, not of what Stoics called the phantasia kataleptiké, 
but of the phantasia metabatiké: unlike the phantasia 
kataleptiké, the phantasia metabatiké can go from the present 
to the not present, from the delón (the manifest) to the adelón 
(the not manifest), and is then the condition of possibility of the 
understanding of time (Chiurazzi 2010). The negative moment 
of the image is not its self-destruction in the evanescence of its 
appearing; it is rather what makes it a trace of an absence, 
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something which, as it is, refers to what is not, to another time, 
in which the work was not. In this form, as understanding of 
time, that is as a negation of the present, the fundamental 
critical instance appears: what Heidegger calls “ontological 
difference.” 
The Greek temple is art, therefore, not in virtue of its 
formal aspects, which following Plato’s classification (Plato 
1921, Soph. 235d ss.) can make it an image more or less similar 
to given proportional relations; rather, it is art as it sets up a 
world (Heidegger 2002, 22), that is, a set of relations belonging 
to historical space and time. In Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Van Gogh’s portrait representing a pair of peasant shoes, the 
work is intended as a place where a world is revealed: through 
the portrait, a whole world is revealed, with its efforts, its 
moods, its needs and its seasons. Aesthetics here becomes 
hermeneutics, as Gadamer foretells in Truth and Method. More 
than being image, the artwork assumes in this way a schematic 
connotation in the Kantian sense of the word: to say that the 
artwork is image means that one understands it only from the 
point of view of the result of its genetic process, and not 
according to the schematic dimension, which constitutes it, 
literally, as a determination of time. 
What emerges from the Heideggerian conception of the 
artwork, which involves a historicization of the image, is its 
practical structure. As in the case of the dream, to interpret a 
work of art means to reconstruct the connections that the 
images are not able to express, and which gives us back its 
formative process, its genesis. To understand the work of art as 
simple mimesis means to condemn it to a simply reproductive, 
and even unproductive, relation, since it involves the negation, 
the repression (in a psychoanalytical meaning) of the world of 
production. But this way of thinking condemns art to remain in 
the conceptual scheme of Plato’s Sophist, in which mimesis is 
understood only in terms of its capacity of reflecting, in less or 
more appropriate way, an external reality. Understood on the 
contrary as a work, the artwork emancipates itself from this 
mimetic relation: thanks to its genetic process, it becomes an 
integral and constitutive part of the world from which it arises; 
it is no longer a mere thing but an effect. Adorno’s theory 
META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – VI (2) / 2014 
560 
 
remains enmeshed in the thing-like conception of the artwork 
precisely by preventing to see it as an effect, as a result of a 
praxis: the only option which remains for the artwork, in order 
to emancipate itself from the world of things, is thus the suicide 
of self-negation. Marx’s theory of fetishism represents a form of 
advice against the risk of the works’ reification, which become 
fetishes – or simulacra – the more they are eradicated from the 
productive process of their genesis. A risk which, I guess, 
Adorno’s mimetic conception also runs, when he writes, as we 
have already quoted, that the immanent process of the works of 
art “appears on the outside like their own doing, not as what 
humans made in them, and not only for other humans.”  
 
4. 
The need to destroy the thing-like essence of the image 
coincides with the need to destroy its positivity, by introducing 
in it a negation, that is, a conceptual dimension, which is the 
very essence of the avant-garde and of contemporary art. The 
death of art meant the death of its preferential medium, which 
to Hegel was the sensible representation: since then, art also 
survives, like philosophy, in the form of the concept. 
The impact this destruction–which actuates an 
interpretative work–has on the image is hyperbolically 
represented by Magritte’s painting to which we have already 
referred: a painting of a pipe with the writing “ceci n’est pas une 
pipe”. Magritte’s painting shows the survival of art in the form 
of a concept, that is, of the understanding, through a complex 
play of references between images and words, but above all 
through an understanding of their relations, which configures 
different meanings and senses.  
The painting represents a pipe: but this representation is 
denied by the underlying writing “ceci n’est pas une pipe”. This 
writing re-establishes the distance between the image and the 
represented object, sophistically confused by virtue of their 
homonymy. We have to remember, in fact, that the problem of 
the image, as an ontological problem, arises in philosophy as a 
problem of homonymy, or of equivocity. Aristotle makes it clear 
at the beginning of Categories: 
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Things are said to be named ‘equivocally’ when, though they have a 
common name [sc.: are homonyms], the definition corresponding with 
the name differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture 
can both lay claim to the name ‘animal’; yet these are equivocally so 
named, for, though they have a common name, the definition 
corresponding with the name differs for each. (Aristotle 1928, Cat. 1, 1-
5) 
The Aristotelian example undoubtedly derives from Plato 
(Villela-Petit 1991), for whom the painter is the creator of 
homonymic realities which deceive because they create 
confusion between reality and appearance (just as the sophist 
does):  
He who professes to be able by virtue of a single art to make all things 
will be able by virtue of the painter’s art, to make imitations which 
have the same name as the real things, and by showing the pictures at 
a distance will be able to deceive the duller ones among young children 
into the belief that he is perfectly able to accomplish in fact whatever 
he wishes to do (Plato 1921, Soph. 234b). 
What Magritte’s painting could mean in the first instance is 
that images deceive: an ancient theorem, as we can see. The 
images betray, for they cause us to confuse the painted pipe 
with the real pipe. The title of the painting, which till now we 
have not revealed, and which will grant us further wonder, is 
actually La trahison des images (“The Treachery, or the 
Betrayal, of Images”). 
But the structure of the relations between image and 
concept is in the painting much more complex. If the sentence 
“ceci n’est pas une pipe” is referred to the image of the pipe, it 
means that the painted pipe is not really a pipe. In this case, 
the painting stages the falsity of the image. However, it is 
possible that the sentence “ceci n’est une pipe”, because of the 
pronoun “ceci”, does not refer to the image, but to itself. In this 
case, it could mean that the sentence itself, “ceci n’est pas une 
pipe”, is not a pipe, which cause it to stand out in contrast to 
the truth of the image of the pipe. The painting would say then 
that writing is never an object, and therefore that there is 
always a radical fracture between words and things, as Michel 
Foucault underlined with different arguments in an essay 
devoted to this painting of Magritte (Foucault 1993). This 
ambiguity in the identification of the referent of the sentence 
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“ceci n’est pas une pipe” is due to the presence of the indexical 
term “ceci” (“this”), which, since it is not a noun, has a 
changeable referent. It is in sum not certain that in Magritte’s 
painting the sentence “ceci n’est pas une pipe” refers to the 
image of the pipe. 
La trahison des images, therefore, refers to two levels of 
betrayal: a first level is that of the image as compared to 
reality, and this cannot be said by the image itself, but only by 
the writing “ceci n’est pas une pipe”; a second betrayal is that of 
language, which deceives in its reference: while it pretends to 
refer to the image, of which it would say its falsehood, it refers 
in truth to itself, saying to be not a thing. 
These two levels are overhung by a further level: the 
title does not refer, actually, to these particular levels, but to 
the whole painting, which in turn is an image. La trahison des 
images says then that the whole painting, as image, is 
deceptive. The entire truth it should carry is therefore 
challenged, as if the painting were saying: “I am lying”. That is: 
“what I am saying is false”. And then: “It is false that ‘ceci n’est 
pas une pipe’”; it, therefore, is a pipe. Through the falsity of the 
whole painting, the truth of the image it contains is 
paradoxically restored.   
This self-negating interpretation of the painting – which 
perhaps is similar to the function Adorno attributes to the 
artwork, which in its appearing is destined dialectically to 
disappear – follows from understanding the genitive in the 
expression La trahison des images as subjective: images betray, 
even this one, even this painting. But we can intend the 
genitive also as objective: in this case, the betrayal is not 
provoked by the images, but consists in betraying the image. 
The painting does, perhaps, just this, precisely by inserting 
writing, which is not an image, beside the image. Here we have 
neither to see nor to read: we have first of all to understand 
what the painting does. Here emerges the definitive 
consequence of understanding the artwork just as a work and 
not as image: it does not represent, it works, literally, it 
performs something, which we can understand by means of 
images, but not as image. Just like the dream. 
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One betrays the image when one contaminates it with 
something other, when one rips out it of the closure of its 
mimetic relation with the represented thing. This is what “to 
interpret” means. What the psychoanalyst should do to the 
dream, according to Freud, is then first of all to betray its 
nature as image (just as Champollion made with hieroglyphs, 
disputing their purely iconic nature) and understand it as a 
rebus, to see it not as a picture, not as a dialectically 
contradictory and evanescent representation, but as something 
meaningful, which must be interpreted. Do we not then resume 
exactly in this title the general function of hermeneutics, and 
perhaps even of psychoanalysis? It is, in all the senses which 
we have here tried to make clear, and which Magritte’s 
painting literally stages, as the dream, according to Freud, 
would do, a trahison des images. 
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